

Line-Rate Cybersecurity: Modern DPI and Encrypted Traffic Fingerprinting at 100 Gbps

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About Us

Luca Deri



- Founder of **ntop**
- Creator of ntopng, nProbe, **nDPI**, ...
- Ph.D. Computer Science, Professor at UniPi
- Regular speaker at networking & security conferences

Alfredo Cardigliano



- Principal Engineer at **ntop**
- Lead developer of **PF_RING**, n2disk, nScrub, ...
- Focus on kernel/user-space integration, line-rate packet processing
- DPDK contributor (SmartNIC drivers)

github.com/ntop

Talk Outline

- Why DPI?
- Cryptographic fingerprinting
- Performance baseline
- Linux Netfilter integration
- 100 Gbps architecture
- Flow offload to hardware
- Open problems & future work
- Conclusions

Why Deep Packet Inspection?

for Monitoring and Security

Traditional Monitoring

- The old world:
 - Port 80 -> HTTP
 - Port 443 -> HTTPS
- The real world today:
 - Netflix, Zoom, Corporate VPN, C&C channels, they all use port 443
 - Web-based SaaS replaced dedicated ports
 - Evasion tools deliberately mimic web traffic

Intrusion Detection Systems

- IDS inspection is traditionally based on signatures and rule-based approaches (byte-based payload analysis)
- They shown their limitations in detection capability, especially when attackers heavily rely on **encryption** to obfuscate communications.

```
alert tcp any any <> any 443 (msg:"APT.Backdoor.MSIL.SUNBURST";  
content:"|16 03|"; depth:2; content:"|55 04 03|"; distance:0;  
content:"digitalcollege.org"; within:50; sid:77600846; rev:1;)
```

nDPI

- **Open source** (GNU LGPL) Deep Packet Inspection toolkit.
- Supports hundreds of protocols including:
 - P2P (BitTorrent)
 - Messaging (Viber, Whatsapp, Telegram, Facebook)
 - Multimedia (YouTube, Last.fm, iTunes)
 - Conferencing (Skype, Webex, Teams, Meet, Zoom)
 - Streaming (Zattoo, Disney, Netflix)
 - Business (VNC, RDP, Citrix)
 - Gaming



What nDPI Provides

- Detect:
 - Layer-7 Application Protocol, e.g. HTTP, YouTube, BitTorrent, etc.
 - Category, e.g. Social Networks, Gaming, Streaming, etc.
 - Geographical location, e.g. country or continent, with the integration with GeoIP databases
 - Autonomous System
- Extract
 - Layer-7 metadata, e.g. TLS SNI, HTTP User Agent, etc.
- Compute
 - Flow Risks, e.g. TLS with no SNI, Binary/executable transfer, etc.

What is a Protocol in nDPI

- Each protocol is identified as MAJOR.MINOR (usually TRANSPORT.APPLICATION)
 - Example: **QUIC**.YouTube
- Today most protocols are HTTP/TLS-based.
- nDPI includes support for dynamic protocol detection based on:
 - DNS query name
 - HTTP Host/Server header fields
 - TLS/QUIC SNI (Server Name Indication)

```
{ "netflix.com", NULL, "netflix" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },  
{ "nflxvideo.net", NULL, "nflxvideo" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },
```

Why (still) DPI?

- Internet traffic is increasingly encrypted (>80%).
- Many traditional clear-text protocols are moving to encryption (e.g. DNS vs DNS-over-HTTPS).
- There is still a lot we can do.
 - Identify the service based on visible information (SNI, CDN, etc.).
 - Analyse encrypted traffic to detect issues, even without accessing the (encrypted) payload.
 - Detect whether a TLS connection is a HTTPS connection, a VPN, or something else.
 - Recognize Malwares, with Cryptographic Fingerprinting and statistical properties, entropy, traffic bins (packet lengths and timings), etc.
 - Associate flow risks to identify communications that are affected by security issues.

Cryptographic Fingerprinting

JA3, JA4, and their structural flaws

Plain-Text vs Encryption

Plain-Text

- Clear content.
- Signature matching or regex on payload (IDS).
- DPI on (plain) payload.

Encryption

- Handshake with configuration parameters.
- Cipher suites, EC curves, extensions.
- Tied to OS, TLS library, browser engine.
- ➔ Can be used to identify a client.

JA3 (2017)

- TLS Fingerprinting for TLS/SSL (similar to HASSH for SSH).
- Designed for cybersecurity (malware detection).
- Quickly became the industry standard (shipped in Zeek, Suricata, nDPI, etc.).
- Creates a fingerprint of the handshake (cipher suites, extensions, elliptic curves).
- Problem: JA3 hash is based on the exact order of TLS extensions and cipher suites -> Malwares can circumvent it by randomizing extensions and reordering the cipher suite.

JA4 (2023)

- TLS Fingerprinting designed to overcome the limitations of JA3.
- Sorting and normalizing cipher suites and extensions.
- Structured format, more human-readable.
- Problem: there are still structural flaws.
- Does not account for *Ephemeral* TLS extensions.
- Malwares (and modern browsers) randomize extension parameters.

nDPI Fingerprint

- Designed to overcome the limitations of JA4 and improve reliability for identifying client applications.
- Ignore ephemeral TLS extensions (*Session Ticket*, *Pre-Shared Key*, *Padding*), thus making it suitable for modern traffic.
- Reduce collisions by including a IP/TCP fingerprint computed on TCP flags, IP TTL bucket, TCP window, TCP options, properly masked.

JA4 vs nDPI Fingerprint

```
ndpiReader -i tls.pcap -K json -k out.json -q
cat out.json | jq | grep ja4
  "ja4": "t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_d8a2da3f94cd",
  "ja4": "t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_d8a2da3f94cd",
  "ja4": "t13d1517h2_8daaf6152771_b6f405a00624",
  "ja4": "t13d1517h2_8daaf6152771_b6f405a00624",
  "ja4": "t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_d8a2da3f94cd",
  "ja4": "t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_d8a2da3f94cd",
```

```
ndpiReader --cfg "tls,metadata.ja_ignore_ephemeral_tls_extn,1" -i tls.pcap -K json -k out.json -q
cat out.json | jq | grep ja4
  "ja4": "t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_31ec0a762479",
  "ja4": "t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_31ec0a762479",
  "ja4": "t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_31ec0a762479",
  "ja4": "t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_31ec0a762479",
  "ja4": "t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_31ec0a762479",
  "ja4": "t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_31ec0a762479",
```

Performance Baseline

nDPI performance

DPI Lifecycle

- Dissectors are evaluated based on Layer-4 information, starting with the one that will most likely match the flow (e.g. TCP/80 -> HTTP dissector first).
- Flow metadata keep the state for non-matching dissectors in order to skip them in future iterations.
- Analysis lasts until a match is found or after too many attempts. Typical figures (average):

DPI Packets (TCP):	301	(5.38 pkts/flow)
DPI Packets (UDP):	182	(1.88 pkts/flow)
DPI Packets (other):	12	(1.00 pkts/flow)

nDPI Performance (Per Core)

nDPI Memory statistics:

nDPI Memory (once): 3.69 KB
Flow Memory (per flow): 1.28 KB
Total memory allocated: 955.13 MB
Setup Time: 32 msec
Packet Processing Time: 756 msec

Traffic statistics:

Ethernet bytes: 1043493248 (includes ethernet CRC/IFC/trailer)
Discarded bytes: 1269660
IP packets: 3000543 of 3295278 packets total
IP bytes: 971480216 (avg pkt size 294 bytes)
Unique flows: 527
TCP Packets: 2567005
UDP Packets: 411579
VLAN Packets: 0
MPLS Packets: 0
PPPoE Packets: 0
Fragmented Packets: 0
Max Packet size: 8981
Packet Len < 64: 1517845
Packet Len 64-128: 208516
Packet Len 128-256: 449421
Packet Len 256-1024: 510237
Packet Len 1024-1500: 312214
Packet Len > 1500: 2310
nDPI throughput: 3.97 M pps / 10.28 Gb/sec
Analysis begin: 17/Aug/2010 22:23:10
Analysis end: 17/Aug/2010 22:49:24
Traffic throughput: 1.91 K pps / 5.06 Mb/sec
Traffic duration: 1573.805 sec
Guessed flow protos: 63
DPI Packets (TCP): 1848 (9.73 pkts/flow)
DPI Packets (UDP): 1165 (4.10 pkts/flow)
DPI Packets (other): 53 (1.00 pkts/flow)

Linux Netfilter Integration

NF_QUEUE & conntrack lifecycle

DPI in the Kernel: Design Constraints

- Integrating DPI into the Linux kernel provides application awareness and enables Layer-7 firewalling capabilities.
- However, this should be avoided:
 - DPI is complex, a dissector crash could take down the kernel.
 - Long DPI processing could introduce overhead and latency.
 - Kernel modules are hard to reload safely for protocol updates.


A Decoupled Architecture

- Idea:
 - Use the NF_QUEUE + conntrack infrastructure provided by the kernel
 - Run DPI in user space, enforces the resulting verdict in the kernel
- With this approach:
 - Kernel never touches DPI logic (failure isolation)
 - Standard Netfilter mechanisms do all the work
 - Zero kernel patches required

Classification Lifecycle

1. Send packets for unclassified flows to user-space.
2. Run Deep Packet Inspection in the application (Slow-Path).
3. Detect the application protocol and compute a verdict according to the policies (mark)
4. Set the marker to the conntrack entry and apply the verdict in kernel space (Fast-Path). Packets are no longer sent to user-space.

NF_QUEUE + conntrack Architecture



Sample Configuration

CT -> Packet: restore verdict/mark from the conntrack

iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --restore-mark

Already classified (mark != 0) -> leave the chain, don't go to userspace via NFQUEUE

iptables -t mangle -A FORWARD -m mark ! --mark 0 -j RETURN

Unclassified (mark == 0) -> hand off to the application (or fail-open if down)

**iptables -t mangle -A FORWARD -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 0 --queue-bypass -m physdev **
--physdev-in \$IFACE

Packet -> CT: save verdict/mark set by the application into the conntrack entry

iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -j CONNMARK --save-mark

Properties of this Design

- Isolation: DPI crash doesn't affect kernel
- Stateful: conntrack carries Application ID for the flow lifetime.
- Low overhead: only first N packets are queued for processing, fast-path for the rest.
- Composable: works with existing iptables/nftables rules.

Scaling Out

- Multiple NF_QUEUE instances, multiple application threads
- NFQUEUE --queue-balance hashes on the 5-tuple in the kernel (a flow lands on the same queue/thread for its whole lifetime)
- no locking, no cross-thread data)


```
iptables -t mangle -A FORWARD -j NFQUEUE --queue-balance 0:3 --queue-bypass \  
-m physdev --physdev-in $IFACE
```

100 Gbps Architecture

PF RING, kernel bypass

Scaling to 100 Gbps [1/2]

- First-order bottleneck: kernel copy overhead
 - Standard Linux network stack: per-packet copy, syscall, IRQ
 - At 100 Gbps / 148 Mpps (64-byte), kernel can't keep up
- Solution: Zero Copy capture (e.g. PF RING ZC or DPDK)
 - NIC DMA (user-space buffer directly)
 - nDPI engine reads from the buffer (zero per-packet copies)
 - Zero kernel involvement on receive path
 - Scaling out: RSS



Scaling to 100 Gbps [2/2]

- Second-order bottleneck: flow table pressure
- Even with kernel bypass, the dominant cost becomes:
 - Processing and maintaining per-flow state for every packet
 - Cost scales with concurrent flows, not just packet rate
 - Cache and TLB pressure on the hash table
- Example: 10 Mpkt/s with 10M active flows = up to 10 M lookups/sec + evictions.
- This bottleneck is in host memory, not the NIC

Stateful Traffic Processing

- Monitoring applications, both passive (e.g. NetFlow) or inline (e.g. IPS systems), typically have to analyse and maintain the state of each network communication.
- This requires a flow table, an in-memory data structure where the application keeps the status of network communications (flow key and metadata).
- Metadata may include:
 - Simple statistics about the packet stream (number of packets and bytes)
 - Information from application layer protocols (e.g. the HTTP URL or the VoIP caller) extracted by DPI engines

Flow Offload to Hardware

SmartNICs and SuperNICs

Hardware Flow-Offload Pipeline

- Concept similar to DPI on NF_QUEUE/conntrack


1.Initial redirection

2.User-space inspection

3.Protocol detection and verdict

4.Flow offload


5.Periodic flow stats retrieval from hardware entries



Target Adapters




- Napatech NT200 SmartNIC
 - NIC + FPGA engine, constrained programmability.
 - **Native** Flow Offload support (Flow Manager).



- NVIDIA BlueField-3 SuperNIC
 - NIC + general-purpose on-board compute (ARM + accelerators).
 - **Programmable** via DOCA.

Napatech - Flow Manager

- Specialized built-in component implementing flow offload.
- Declared specs:
 - Cache capacity: 140 Million flows
 - Max flow creation rate: 3 Million flows/sec
- Validated with nProbe Cento (100 Gbit NetFlow probe), using the PF_RING API.



Learning Flows

- Flows are programmed by the software, by 5-tuple, when DPI completes.
- Flow (offloaded) metadata include:
 - **Flow ID** generated by the application (used to correlate hardware and software flow table entries).
 - **Action**: discard, forward (to the software or a twin interface when inline).
 - Options for the Flow Manager (e.g. TCP auto unlearn).

Packet Markers

- Packets received from the adapter are marked as:
 - **Miss**: no match / no flow programmed yet.
 - **Hit**: flow match in the adapter.
 - **Unhandled**: unable to match the flow, no hardware pipeline resources.

Hardware Flow Events


- The adapter delivers flow events, on a dedicated stream, including:
 - Flow unlearned due to **timeout**.
 - Flow unlearned due to **TCP termination**.
 - Flow unlearned due to explicit **application unlearn** command.

Test Results

- Tested on Intel Xeon Gold 6526Y with Napatech NT200A02.
- Traffic load: 89 Mpps with 60-byte packets (60 Gbps).
- CPU load (average per core) and packet loss have been measured, under different flow rates and number of active flows:
 - 10K active flows, 1K new flows/sec.
 - 100K active flows, 10K new flows/sec.
 - 1M active flows, 100K new flows/sec.
 - 10M active flows, 1M new flows/sec.


CPU Load (Inline)

- @ 89 Mpps 60 Gbps with DPI on 16 cores (RSS)




Packet Loss (Inline)

- @ 89 Mpps 60 Gbps with DPI on 16 cores (RSS)




NVIDIA BlueField

- DPU Mode
 - NIC owned and controlled by the embedded ARM subsystem.




- NIC Mode
 - Behaves exactly like a standard (ConnectX) NIC.




DOCA Flow

- DOCA is an SDK for programming hardware accelerators on NVIDIA adapters.
- Divided into components (*Flow*, *Compress*, etc.)
- DOCA *Flow* is the one required to accelerate packet processing - supported both on NVIDIA BlueField and ConnectX
- APIs for building processing pipelines by creating pipes and chaining them.

Pipeline



Pipe




DOCA Flow CT Pipe

- DOCA *Flow CT* (Connection Tracking) is a specialized pipe providing what is required for the flow offload:
 - 5-tuple table to store entries (flows)
 - API to add, remove, update entries
 - Per-entry statistics
 - Flow aging
- Available both on the BlueField DPU and on the host (also on plain ConnectX)

"Kryptonite"

- One-file application implementing Flow Offload using DOCA Flow CT
- Shadow (Software) Flow Table
 - Keep track of offloaded flows
 - Store additional metadata (e.g. DPI)
- Flow export (as text)
- (Optional) Inline traffic forwarding
- Source code: <https://github.com/ntop/bluefield-kryptonite>

Kryptonite CT-based Pipeline




Test Results

- Tested both on Intel Xeon Gold 6526Y (NIC mode) and on the BlueField-3 ARM (DPU mode).
- Traffic load:
 - 2 Million flows (maximum capacity configurable on BlueField-3 according to our tests).
 - 100 Gbps 200-byte packets (55.8 Mpps) / 40 Gbps 60-byte packets (60 Mpps)
- ➔ Measured CT performance:
 - Max flow creation rate: 1.5 Million flows/sec on the DPU, 2.7 on the host.
 - Packet loss only occurs (on the Slow Path) when new flows rate exceeds the max creation rate.
 - Full rate (no loss) for traffic handled by the pipeline (Fast Path).

Napatech vs BlueField

- Napatech NT200 FPGA with Flow Manager
 - 140 Million flows
 - 1.5 Million flows/sec single-core / 3 Million flows/sec with multiple streams
 - Selected actions
- BlueField-3 with DOCA Flow CT
 - 2 Million flows (maximum configurable in our tests)
 - 1.3-1.5 M flows/s on DPU / up to 2.7 Million flows/sec on x86 (NIC mode)
 - Programmable actions

Scaling Out



Open Problems & Future Work [1/2]

- Hardware flow-table offload defers the bottleneck but does not eliminate it.
- At high flow-creation rate, host (or DPU) memory becomes the bottleneck (hash table lookups).
- Directions:
 - Mitigate cache/TLB pressure with cache-optimized flow table.
 - Address attack-induced flow-table exhaustion (e.g. DDoS)

Open Problems & Future Work [2/2]

- The netfilter and hardware offload hide traffic (to DPI) once it has been offloaded.
- Emerging protocols introduce additional challenges:
 - TLS 1.3 encrypts the Certificate message.
 - Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) hides SNI and most ClientHello fields, removing the primary signal for fingerprinting and SNI-based filtering.
 - QUIC Connection ID decoupled from the 5-tuple and Connection ID rotation break the flow correlation assumption that flow table offload relies on.

Conclusions

- JA3 and JA4 share a structural flaw: any exact-match fingerprint over mutable fields is sensitive to deliberate randomization. nDPI fingerprint tries to address this.
- NF_QUEUE + conntrack integration: let nDPI classify initial packets of a flow in user space while the kernel enforces verdicts natively, bounding DPI's exposure to kernel-space failure modes and with zero kernel patches.
- Hardware flow offload is empirically validated: Napatech (140M flows, up to 3 Mflows/sec) and BlueField-3 (2M flows tested, up to 2.7 Mflows/sec). Both reduce host CPU load, PCIe and memory bandwidth utilization.

Thank You

Resources

- nDPI: github.com/ntop/nDPI
- PF_RING: github.com/ntop/PF_RING
- Kryptonite: github.com/ntop/bluefield-kryptonite
- ntop blog: ntop.org/blog

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